‘Leaving Afghanistan! Are you sure?’ European efforts to deter potential migrants through information campaigns by Oeppen, Ceri
n.b. This is a pre-proof of the following article, to be published soon (most likely June 2016).  Please 
cite as follows:  
Oeppen, C. (2016) ‘Leaving Afghanistan! Are you Sure?’ European Efforts to Deter Potential Migrants 
Through Information Campaigns, Human Geography, 9(2), 57-68. 
 
 
‘Leaving Afghanistan! Are You Sure?’ European Efforts to Deter 
Potential Migrants Through Information Campaigns 
 
Ceri Oeppen, University of Sussex 
 
Abstract 
 
Policymakers in Europe are currently under pressure to both lessen the number of incoming 
asylum-seekers and ‘irregular migrants’ and address the humanitarian crises occurring at 
Europe’s border crossings. Increasingly, we see an externalization of Europe’s border 
controls, as migration management policies try to stop migrants before they even arrive in 
Europe. One form of externalized control is information campaigns, discouraging would-be 
migrants and asylum-seekers from leaving their countries of origin. Such campaigns intend to 
inform potential migrants about the difficulties of settling in Europe and the dangers of being 
smuggled. As such, these campaigns aim to both discourage migration and present that 
discouragement as a means of protecting people from financial and bodily risk. I examine the 
use of information campaigns in Afghanistan, and ask why they are continued, when 
ethnographic work with Afghans suggests that the campaigns are unlikely to be believed. I 
argue that these information campaigns are symbolic, fulfilling the need of policymakers to 
be seen to be doing something, and also – and more ominously – serve a role of shifting 
responsibility for the risks of the journey onto Afghans themselves, rather than the restrictive 
border regimes of the EU.  
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Introduction 
 
An important announcement on behalf of the Council of the City of Leicester, 
England (…) In your own interests and those of your family, you should accept 
the advice of the Uganda Resettlement Board and not come to Leicester (advert in 
the Uganda Argus, taken out by Leicester City Council, 1972). 
 
On 30 January 2013, in light of the UK government’s proposed information campaign 
discouraging Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants, a BBC radio programme – Today – 
invited Lord Bach (Labour peer and former Leicester City Councillor) and Mr Mughal 
(former Chair of Leicester City Council’s race relations committee) to reflect on the 1972 
information campaign in the Uganda Argus, quoted above. Both interviewees felt that the 
advert was not only racist but also had not been successful, with Lord Bach suggesting, ‘It 
was actually almost an advertisement for people to come’, and concluding that the racist 
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advertising campaign ‘was a very long time ago (…) and nothing like that could thankfully 
ever happen again’.  
Yet, information campaigns aimed at discouraging would-be migrants continue to be 
used by the UK and other countries, and are a key component of what has come to be known 
as ‘managed migration policy’ (Pécoud 2010). Below is an example from a German 
information campaign in 2015 aimed at Afghans.   
Do not believe the rumours and false information deliberately spread by human 
traffickers about the allegedly easy trip and easy life in Germany. Do not risk your 
lives by trying to flee to Europe. Human traffickers are criminals who are only 
interested in money. They don’t tell the truth and don’t care about human lives 
(Official Facebook page of the Germany Embassy in Afghanistan). 
 
Almost half a century apart – and from print media to social media – the message is the same: 
‘Do not come here!’. Yet in both cases this exclusionary message is couched in terms of 
humanitarian concern – neither of these examples explicitly says ‘We do not want you here’; 
rather, they imply that, for the target reader’s own good, their own safety, they should not 
come ‘here’. Vaughan-Williams (2015: 3) argues that EU migration management 
‘(re)produces the “irregular” migrant as potentially both a life to be protected and a security 
threat to protect against’. This juxtaposition can clearly be seen in the motivation and text of 
both the Leicester City advert and the German information campaign.   
In this paper, I look at the ways in which contemporary European governments have 
tried to discourage migration through information campaigns.  Using the example of 
information campaigns in Afghanistan, I discuss why they are produced, especially when 
previous research suggests they are unlikely to be trusted, and even the institutions that create 
such campaigns acknowledge that there is little evidence of their impact (Toms and Thorpe 
2012). The paper proceeds as follows. First, I briefly review what some of the existing 
literature, both practice-orientated and academic, has to say about information campaigns 
targeted at migrants. Second, I take a recent example of a German information campaign 
targeted at Afghans to explore the implications of a contemporary information campaign 
targeted at potential migrants and refugees living in an insecure setting. Third, I draw on the 
literature and examples to build the argument that these information campaigns are symbolic, 
fulfilling the need of policymakers to be seen to be doing something about ‘the migration 
crisis’. More cynically, such campaigns serve the purpose of shifting responsibility for the 
risks of the journey onto Afghans themselves, rather than the restrictive border regimes of the 
EU. 
 
Information campaigns discouraging potential migrants 
 
Information campaigns aimed at potential migrants1 in their countries of origin (and 
sometimes in transit countries) have been used by European states since the early 1990s 
(Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud 2007). They represent one of the ways in which contemporary 
migration management has externalized some aspects of border control to far beyond the 
geographical boundaries of destination countries. They also indicate the perceived need to 
start migration control ‘upstream’, to use the vocabulary of the British government (see 
Hughes 2015; Toms and Thorpe 2012) – to start controlling movement before it even occurs.  
Information campaigns’ specific content and modes of delivery vary but normally 
include a combination of informing potential migrants about the procedural aspects of 
immigration/asylum in the destination country (including removals and deportations) and the 
risks of traveling through non-regularized channels, particularly the risks of being smuggled 
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or trafficked. In theory, and according to the UNHCR’s guidance (2001, 2011), they should 
not be used to discourage people from seeking asylum where protection is needed, and should 
provide information about regularized migration routes where they exist. Information 
campaigns represent an interesting sub-section of migration management in the context of 
increasingly restrictive European migration regimes. It is hard to argue that providing 
information is detrimental to the potential migrant, especially if it purports to have the safety 
of the migrant as its priority; consequently it is an area of migration management where 
migration policymakers can draw in NGOs and community organizations, as well as intra-
governmental partners such as Development Ministries, in ways that would be impossible for 
more control-orientated activities (Pécoud 2010).  
A number of practice-orientated reports provide guidelines on how to design and 
operate information campaigns (see, for example, Koser and Pinkerton 2002; UNHCR 2011). 
Browne (2015) provides a useful summary of what is thought to be best practice, including 
using multiple media techniques to convey the information in an engaging way, and targeting 
the whole community in recognition that family and social networks are often highly 
influential in shaping migration aspirations and decisions. However, it is important to note 
that even those who promote information campaigns as an important migration management 
tool are not clear on how to evaluate what makes a successful campaign (European Migration 
Network 2012; Toms and Thorpe 2012).  
The basic narrative (after Boswell 2011) of information campaigns aimed at 
discouraging migration is that, if potential migrants can be made aware of the risks, 
particularly the risks of traveling outside regularized channels (for example, with a smuggler), 
they will not migrate. Consequently, migration is represented as almost exclusively negative, 
with little chance of success for the migrants involved (Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud 2007). Yet, 
clearly, people do continue to migrate, and take great bodily and financial risks to do so. 
Does this mean that the information campaigns have failed to reach the right target audiences? 
Perhaps. More likely, however, as suggested by a number of empirical studies, is that 
migrants are already aware of the risks outlined by information campaigns but decide, for 
various reasons, to migrate anyway (Alpes and Nyberg Sørensen 2015; Carling and 
Hernández‐Carretero 2011; Heller 2014; Hernández-Carretero and Carling 2012; 
Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud 2007). 
In some cases, it is easy to see why, despite knowledge of the risks, people would leave: 
for example, those fleeing war and persecution, for whom the alternative is an even higher 
risk of death or injury, or those to whom the poet Warsan Shire refers in her poem, Home: 
‘You have to understand, that no one puts their children in a boat, unless the water is safer 
than the land’ (Shire 2013: xi). However, this does not explain why people from ‘relatively 
safe’ countries also take on the risks of irregular migration. Empirical work with migrants 
and potential migrants does shed some light on this. For example, Carling and 
Hernández‐Carretero’s (2011: 49) research with Senegalese ‘boat migrants’ suggests that a) 
potential migrants may consider themselves already experts in the potential risks, especially 
if they have sea-faring experience; b) they may distrust the campaigns, especially if they 
suspect that these are driven by the goal of preventing migration; and c) they may decide that 
the improved opportunities available – if successful – justify the risk. Meanwhile, 
Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud (2007) discuss the existence of ‘migration cultures’, whereby 
migration becomes a normative act, to be undertaken whatever the risks, similar to 
Monsutti’s (2007) findings regarding the social practice of migration as a ‘rite of passage’ for 
young Afghan men. Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud (2007) suggest that the ‘objective knowledge’ 
provided by information campaigns cannot counteract the ‘migratory disposition’: the idea 
that migration is a way to escape the ‘stagnation’ of everyday life. 
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Yet, despite these critiques of information campaigns and questions about their efficacy, 
they persist. In fact, since the publication of the European Migration Network’s synthesis 
report on European countries’ actions to try to reduce irregular migration in 2012, the number 
of European countries using information campaigns as an externalized migration 
management tool has increased. In the following section, I examine a recent information 
campaign aimed at Afghans considering migration to Germany. 
 
Information campaigns aimed at Afghans 
 
My initial interest in information campaigns was prompted by the largely negative and 
distrustful responses of my Afghan research participants to campaigns promoting ‘assisted 
voluntary return’ to Afghanistan from the UK during the mid-2000s, and from the UK and 
Norway in 2012. In this paper, however, I shift the focus from Afghans already outside the 
country to the information campaigns targeted at potential migrants and refugees in 
Afghanistan, such as the ‘Rumours About Germany’ campaign, aimed at persuading and 
educating those considering leaving for Europe.  
Despite the current understandable focus on people displaced from Syria, Afghans 
remain one of the larger groups of asylum-seekers in Europe, following a shifting conflict 
that has been ongoing for more than 35 years. With renewed Taliban offensives and the 
political, economic and security situation in Afghanistan showing no sign of improving, this 
flow is unlikely to cease and, in fact, has seen a massive increase between 2014 and 2015, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. In 2015, Hungary, Sweden and Germany received the highest number 
of Afghan asylum applications in the EU but Afghans are spread across the whole of Europe 
(and, indeed, the world). 
 
Figure 1. Afghan citizens applying for asylum, 2008-2015. EU total and selected 
countries. 
 
 
Source: EUROSTAT (2016). 
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European governments have used information campaigns as part of their overall 
strategy of reducing the number of asylum-seekers (and other migrants) from countries like 
Afghanistan. Whilst acknowledging the diversity of reasons why people choose to leave 
Afghanistan (see Majidi et al. 2016), there is no doubt that conflict and insecurity, and the 
lack of adequate protection for those targeted by government and anti-government forces, are 
a major factor in people’s decision to leave. For this reason, information campaigns that try to 
deter people from leaving to seek asylum are deeply suspect, as suggested by the UNHCR 
(2001: 13) in their response to consultations about the development of a common EU 
immigration policy:   
 
Because information campaigns may be interpreted as a form of deterrence to 
refugee flight, UNHCR would not normally be involved in their implementation. 
For the same reason, UNHCR would have to insist that such programmes should 
be strictly limited to those situations where the great majority of people who are 
leaving a country are demonstrably not in need of international protection. 
 
In 2012, in a study produced for the European Migration Network, Schneider reports 
that Germany had not been involved in any campaigns aimed at preventing irregular 
migration, and cites the UNHCR’s concerns as evidence of the controversial nature of 
information campaigns with such aims. However, from 2015, Germany has been actively 
involved in an information campaign in Afghanistan, called ‘Rumours About Germany’, 
which Human Rights Watch has branded ‘irresponsible’ given the ongoing, and worsening, 
conflict in Afghanistan (Ilsley 2015). 
 
‘Rumours About Germany’  
 
The German government, through its embassy in Afghanistan, has embarked on an 
information campaign in Afghanistan. Billboards were erected in Kabul, Herat and Mazar-e-
Sharif, with slogans in Dari and Pashto posing questions such as ‘Leaving Afghanistan! Are 
you sure?’ and ‘Leaving Afghanistan? Think about it again’. Under the slogans are written 
‘#RumoursAboutGermany’ and a weblink – www.RumoursAboutGermany.info (last 
accessed 07 March 2016) – which redirects to Germany in Afghanistan, the official Facebook 
page of the Germany Embassy in Afghanistan. The billboards were accompanied by a social 
media campaign using Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, as well as stories in conventional 
print and television media.  
Of the 22 posts on the Germany in Afghanistan Facebook page in February 2016, ten 
were explicitly relating to migration issues. In Table 1, I quote an excerpt from each post that 
gives an idea of its content, and categorize them according to whether their focus is on a) the 
procedural aspects of asylum in Germany; b) the deterrence and control measures used by the 
German government (for example, in relation to removing rejected asylum-seekers); c) the 
risks of the journey to Europe and the dangers of trusting smugglers; or d) the reconstruction 
potential and responsibility of Afghan returnees and non-migrants.   
 
The Rumours About Germany campaign follows many of the guides (see Browne 2015) 
about information campaigns and has much in common with campaigns conducted by other 
countries such as the UK and Australia. Looking at Table 1, we see a mix of messages, 
including information about asylum procedures, the control and removal of rejected asylum-
seekers, the risks of being ‘in the hands of people smugglers’ and messages meant to 
encourage Afghans to either not leave in the first place, or to return in order to ‘help to 
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rebuild their country’. As per suggestions based on previous information campaigns (see 
Browne 2015; Koser and Pinkerton 2002), the campaign uses multiple media methods and is 
designed to be seen by a reasonably wide audience – not just potential migrants but their 
families, too.  
 
Table 1. Posts relating to migration on the ‘Germany in Afghanistan’ Facebook page, in 
reverse chronological order, February 2016 
 
Type of post Quote from accompanying text Category 
Photos 
The German NGO HELP distributes flyers to inform Afghans about 
German asylum law and to ruin business for people smugglers who 
profit from spreading false rumours. 
Asylum procedure 
Journey risks 
YouTube link 
The majority of illegal Afghan refugees will not be accepted in 
Germany and will [be] expelled forcefully [video of interview with 
German Ambassador]. 
Deterrence  
Text post New German asylum rules – Pashto Asylum procedure 
Text post New German asylum rules – Dari Asylum procedure 
Link to news 
story 
The German parliament voted to tighten German laws on asylum. 
The new rules are designed to speed up the processing of asylum 
claims, to better distribute the refugees within Germany and to 
make expulsions and deportations easier. 
Asylum procedure 
Deterrence 
Link to pdf 
The attached leaflets have been designed by the NGO HELP e.V. in 
order to provide important information on asylum [in Germany]. 
Asylum procedure 
Press release 
Today, 125 Afghan citizens return to Afghanistan: after a difficult 
way to Germany in the hands of people smugglers they realized that 
their future is in Afghanistan and that they are needed in their home 
country. 
Deterrence 
Journey risks 
Reconstruction 
News post about 
visit of German 
Interior Minister 
The main focus of the visit lay on the problems of irregular 
migration from Afghanistan to Europe (…) [the Minister] also 
emphasized the necessity to work together with the Afghan 
government in order to combat the causes of migration and to 
prevent an exodus of young, skilled Afghans. He urged the Afghan 
people not to trust in rumours and misinformation deliberately 
spread by people smugglers and to stay and help rebuild their 
country. Afghans whose request for asylum in Germany is not 
approved will face repatriation. 
Reconstruction 
Journey risks 
Deterrence 
Link to news 
story 
The German Interior Minister Thomas De Maiziere during a visit to 
Kabul on Monday promised Afghanistan financial assistance to help 
reintegrate Afghan citizens. 
Reconstruction 
Link to German 
government 
website 
The German Government has decided to make it easier for the 
authorities to expel foreign nationals found guilty of crimes. 
Moreover, it will be possible in future to deny recognised refugee 
status to asylum-seekers who commit and are convicted of, for 
example, offences against life or against sexual self-determination. 
Recognised refugees can also have their status removed in such 
cases. 
Deterrence 
Asylum procedure 
   
As mentioned, the Rumours About Germany campaign has been criticized by Human 
Rights Watch and Afghan community organizations for trying to deter people from escaping 
an insecure situation (Ilsley 2015). In an interview with Deutsche Welle2 (2015), German 
Ambassador to Afghanistan Markus Potzel defended the campaign:  
 
We want our campaign to reach those in Afghanistan who are considering fleeing 
to Europe, and especially Germany (…) We want to tell them: ‘Do not believe any 
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rumors or deliberately spread false information about the supposedly simple life in 
Germany. Think twice about whether you really want to sell all of your 
possessions to pay criminal smugglers and risk your life on the journey. Really 
think about if you truly want to leave your home, your family, and your friends 
behind for an uncertain and dangerous future far away from your homeland (…)’. 
It’s not about deterrence, but rather about clarification – especially about the risks 
involved with fleeing and illegal migration, as well as the legal framework and the 
reality of life in Germany. 
 
In this excerpt, Potzel manages to convey the financial and bodily risks associated with being 
smuggled and the challenges of settling in Germany, underlined by the sedentarist norm that 
people should ‘naturally’ remain in their ‘homeland’. As with the Leicester City advert, the 
message conveyed is duplicitous: it could be read as a concern for the safety of the potential 
migrant, but the underlying aim – to discourage migration to Germany – is clear, despite 
Potzel’s claim that it is not about deterrence. Despite using the word ‘fleeing’, he does not 
mention the reasons why people might want to leave Afghanistan, nor their right to seek 
asylum in Germany or anywhere else. Alongside the message regarding the difficulties and 
risks of migrating, Potzel continues by reminding Afghans of their responsibility to the future 
of Afghanistan as follows:  
 
We firmly stand by our engagement in Afghanistan, and we are committed to the 
country’s stabilization and reconstruction. It is crucial, however, that the Afghans 
do not turn their backs on their own country during these difficult times, but rather 
help build the future (Deutsche Welle 2015).  
 
I have written elsewhere (Oeppen 2010) about the way in which European governments 
have encouraged Afghans living in the diaspora to return to Afghanistan to contribute to its 
reconstruction, but the use of this argument to discourage Afghans from leaving is relatively 
new. Discouraging people from seeking opportunities elsewhere by appealing to their sense 
of patriotism and their duty to ‘rebuild’ is exactly the kind of ‘compassionate racism’ which 
Sriskandarajah (2005) refers to in his work in relation to the so-called ‘brain drain’.  
 
At around the same time as the Rumours About Germany campaign was launched, the 
Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation started its own social media campaign. Images 
such as that in Figure 2 were shared on its Facebook page and Twitter feed. Some fed into the 
message of rebuilding Afghanistan. A photo of a father and son standing in lush farmland had 
the slogan, ‘I love my country. I will not leave, I will build it for my loved ones’. But others 
were more brutal about the risks of the journey itself. One showed an image of an 
overcrowded boat, with the slogan ‘Did you know Afghanistan has the highest number of 
dead illegal refugees in the world? Don't let your loved ones walk straight into death’. 
Meanwhile, in Figure 2, through the ‘migration door’ lie dead bodies surrounded by people in 
orange boiler suits. Whilst the image is actually taken from a news agency photo of rescue 
workers on a Libyan beach, for many Afghans the orange boiler suit is also evocative of the 
Global War on Terror and Guantanamo Bay, and their status as perceived security threats. 
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Figure 2. A poster shared on social media by the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and 
Repatriation, warning their ‘compatriot’ of the potential risks of migration, and pointing out 
starkly that there may be no return 
 
 
Source: www.facebook.com/morr.gov. 
 
The timing of the Afghan Ministry’s campaign – coinciding with the German campaign 
– is noteworthy. It is well known that the Afghan government is highly reliant on donor 
countries for its administration, services and security. It would be interesting to know 
whether or not the campaigns were intentionally coordinated. 
Germany has troops stationed in Afghanistan and has been active in international 
reconstruction efforts. Recently, German government ministers have been explicitly linking 
their remaining presence in Afghanistan to migration issues. In February 2016, the German 
Interior Minister, Thomas de Maiziere, visited Afghanistan and, in talks with Afghan 
government officials, said ‘We’re staying here as long as it’s necessary, but we also expect 
that the Afghan population stays here, we want the influx of refugees to be stopped’ (cf. Sims 
2016). He then went on to echo Ambassador Potzel and the Rumours About Germany 
campaign by reminding the Afghan audience how difficult and risky it was to migrate, and 
urging them not to listen to the ‘propaganda’ about Germany spread by people smugglers 
(Sims 2016).  
The Rumours About Germany campaign and the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and 
Repatriation campaign both draw on a mix of guilt, fear and, in the German case, information 
about reception and removal to try to discourage Afghans from leaving Afghanistan. Neither 
campaign adequately acknowledges the reasons why Afghans may want to take the risk and 
leave Afghanistan anyway. The other glaringly obvious omission is any information about 
why Afghans would have to risk their lives ‘in the hands of people smugglers’, rather than 
enter Europe in a safe, dignified manner in order to exercise their right to seek asylum there.    
 
The symbolic power of information campaigns 
 
In the Essentials of Migration Management, an IOM (2004) training resource for migration 
policymakers, a discussion section raises the question of why governments should be 
proactive about providing information on migration opportunities and risks rather than being 
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silent (perhaps in the hope of not encouraging people). Their answer to this question is 
striking. 
 
When ‘objective’ information is not available, ‘bad,’ fragmented or deliberately 
distorted information takes its place. When information is not provided by 
governments, the view promoted by trafficking organizations will be encouraged, 
namely that irregular migration pays. Better communication, while not a solution 
to this challenge, will portray government as more in control of their polities and 
borders and more caring towards potential new citizens (IOM 2004: 10). 
 
Apart from reducing information sources to government or traffickers (not to mention 
collating smuggling and trafficking) and ignoring the widely acknowledged role of social 
networks, the answer is troublesome in other ways. It parallels my interpretation that one of 
the unspoken goals of information campaigns is symbolic: they allow governments to be seen 
to be doing something to control their borders whilst still maintaining a humanitarian image. 
From my position as a member of the UK public I have observed an increase in 
awareness and shift in perceptions regarding migrants and refugees arriving in Europe. From 
the 2013 Lampedusa disaster, but particularly after the tragic death (and subsequent iconic 
photo) of three-year-old Alan Kurdi from Syria, there has generally been more public 
sympathy towards the plight of individual migrants, even whilst the British Social Attitudes 
Survey still suggests that the majority of the UK population would like to see immigration 
reduced. I would imagine that this paradox could be similarly observed in other European 
countries. Consequently, policymakers seeking to control migration are left with a dilemma. 
They have to be seen to control European borders but are aware that more aggressive actions, 
such as ‘push-backs’ at sea and physical confrontation between migrants and border guards, 
do not portray them in a positive light to significant sections of their voting public. 
‘Educating’ potential migrants before they leave their country of origin through information 
campaigns provides a policy narrative that is both compelling and accessible to the public and 
media, even if, as the literature review above indicates, we do not know whether such 
campaigns are demonstrably successful in reducing either the risks to migrants or migrant 
numbers. 
The increasing interest in information campaigns has occurred alongside a strong 
narrative from European policymakers which portrays people smugglers as the real threat, 
both to the safety of migrants and to the integrity of border control systems, and as being to 
blame for the increasing numbers of asylum-seekers and ‘irregular migrants’. ‘Saving lives 
[through rescue at sea] is not going to be enough. We need to do much more to smash the 
criminal gangs that are fuelling this terrible trade in people…’, said UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron (cf. Hughes 2015). The term smuggler is often used interchangeably with 
trafficker by policymakers, despite important differences between the two which further 
emphasize the construction of their role as the primary exploiter of migrants. There is 
existing literature problematizing the construct of ‘the criminal smuggler’ (see, for example, 
Alpes and Nyberg Sørensen 2015; Carling and Hernández‐Carretero 2011; Koser 2001) and it 
is beyond the scope of this paper to review it in detail. To summarize, it is over-simplifying a 
complex reality to always portray smugglers as criminals who do not care about the lives of 
their charges. They could also be portrayed as facilitators or brokers – smugglers can provide 
a valuable service, helping refugees to escape from dangerous situations (Koser 2001). The 
narrative of smugglers as the main cause of risk to migrants and asylum-seekers fails to 
acknowledge why a migrant-smuggling business exists: the lack of regularized legal routes 
for people from countries like Afghanistan (or Syria, Somalia, Eritrea etc.) to travel into 
Europe. As Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2011: 45) point out, ‘Professional smuggling 
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services are a necessity for the vast majority of those who seek asylum in Europe, regardless 
of the merits of their claim’. 
Apart from shifting responsibility for migrant endangerment from European border 
regimes to smugglers, what other symbolic purpose does the focus on ‘criminal smugglers’ 
serve, particularly in relation to information campaigns? It feeds the notion that migrants are 
not aware of the risks of being smuggled, despite countless empirical accounts, some of 
which are cited in this paper (and see also the paper by Belloni in this special issue), which 
suggest that this is inaccurate. As long as the European public is told that smugglers are both 
the cause of increasing numbers of arrivals and a threat to the migrants’ safety and wellbeing, 
then information campaigns – sympathetically warning would-be migrants of the risks of 
migration and consequently discouraging it – make for a compelling policy narrative, 
allowing European policymakers to position their actions as controlling migration, whilst 
being seen to meet their humanitarian responsibilities (after Vaughan-Williams 2015).  
The implications of this policy narrative, based on ‘wrong assumptions’ (Alpes and 
Nyberg Sørensen 2015) leads me to my final argument – that, in addition to shifting 
responsibility and blame onto smugglers, the presence of information campaigns also shifts 
responsibility onto the migrants themselves. In a fascinating account of the use of images and 
other media in the control of migration, Heller (2014) cites an interview with Laurentiu 
Ciobanica, the head of mass information activities for IOM, who explains what they hope 
their information campaigns will achieve: ‘We would like to have an impact on information 
levels, then move on to perception, then attitudes, and ultimately try to influence, for the 
better, the behaviour of migrants’ (my emphasis, cf. Heller 2014: 312). Although claiming to 
be reluctant to make an explicit link between the two, in the same article Heller also points to 
the way in which the violence and control of colonialism were legitimized by parallel 
narratives of a caring and civilizing mission. He cites the work of anthropologist Brian Larkin 
on educational cinema as a ‘civilizing tool’ in 1920s’ British-colonised Nigeria: 
 
…although Africans were perceived as naturally inferior, it was nonetheless 
considered that by training them, they could produce modern rational subjects (…) 
This echoes IOM’s belief that the migrants leave their countries based on ill-
informed and irrational decisions and that, with better information on risks 
provided to them, they will not leave (Heller 2014: 309).   
 
In other words, information campaigns such as Rumours About Germany provide Afghans 
with ‘objective information’ (IOM 2004) and advice about the risks of fleeing Afghanistan 
for Europe. It follows that, if they then choose to ignore this paternalistic advice and travel to 
Europe, they, rather than the European migration policymakers, can be blamed for the 
dangers they encounter on the way. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Vaughan-Williams (2015) entreats scholars interested in the persistently violent nature of 
European migration management to pay attention to the inherent ambiguity between the 
representation of migrants both as a threat and as human lives worthy of being saved. I argue 
that information campaigns represent one way in which migration policymakers can 
ostensibly be providing an ‘objective’ educational service (protecting migrants from financial 
and bodily danger) whilst also be seen to be taking action to try to reduce the numbers of 
migrants and refugees arriving in Europe.  
This raises interesting questions about the intended audience for European 
governments’ information campaigns. The declared primary audience is potential migrants 
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but I suggest that the actual intended audience is much wider and includes European publics 
as well as the governments of migrants’ countries of origin. Another potential audience, 
which I have not addressed, is, of course, existing migrants and diasporas. How do Afghans 
living in Europe feel when they see the images and other media discouraging their 
compatriots from leaving Afghanistan? During previous fieldwork, a young female Afghan in 
London told me how she felt when she saw targeted advertizing in Dari from the IOM 
suggesting that she ‘go home’ through an assisted voluntary-return programme: ‘This is my 
home now, why don’t they want me to stay?’. Despite Ambassador Potzel’s claim that the 
Rumours About Germany campaign is about information, not deterrence, the sense that they 
are trying to discourage Afghans from coming to Germany is hard to miss, and the campaign 
will be seen by Afghans in Germany through social media and Afghan satellite television. 
The implications of seeing such messages for their socio-cultural integration would make for 
interesting further research.  
Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2011: 49) write that ‘Awareness campaigns are 
harmless interventions in the sense that migrants’ safety or integrity is not directly affected’. 
As such, information campaigns fulfil a humanitarian narrative about protecting would-be 
migrants from exposing themselves to the risks of being smuggled into Europe. In this paper I 
have argued that this narrative both ignores the reasons why people living in countries like 
Afghanistan might want and need to leave their country, and fails to acknowledge that 
European border control and migration management are the key reasons why people need to 
avail themselves of the services of people smugglers.  Thus, whilst they may not appear 
directly harmful, I suggest that information campaigns have symbolic power, shifting 
responsibility for migrant injury and death onto, first, the shoulders of the smugglers and, 
ultimately, the shoulders of the migrants themselves.  
 
Notes 
 
1 Here I use ‘migrants’ in an ‘umbrella’ sense to refer to all people migrating, whatever 
the reason for their migration and whatever bureaucratic category they may fall into 
(asylum-seeker, labour migrant, irregular migrant etc.).  
2 Deutsche Welle is Germany’s international broadcaster. It describes its mission as 
conveying ‘Germany as a nation rooted in European culture and as a liberal, democratic 
state based on the rule of law’ – http://www.dw.com/en/about-dw/profile/s-30688 (last 
accessed 07 March 2016). 
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